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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that sectoral export growth decreases exporters’ survival prob-
ability, whereas this is not true for non–exporters. Models with firm heterogeneity in total
factor productivity (TFP) predict the opposite. To solve this puzzle, we develop a two–factor
framework where firms differ in factor intensities. Thus, export growth increases competition
for the factor used intensively by exporters, eliminating some of them, while non–exporters
benefit. Interacting heterogeneity in factor shares with heterogeneity in TFP we show that
factor market competition reduces the growth in average TFP brought about by trade liber-
alization.
JEL classification numbers: F12, F14, F16, L11
Keywords: Firm dynamics, two–factor trade model, firm heterogeneity in factor input ratios
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the Efige project (No. 225551) funded by the
European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme. We would also like to thank Laura Hering,
Volodymyr Lugovskyy, Vincent Rebeyrol, Cecilia Testa and participants at the EEA 2010 meeting, German Eco-
nomic Association 2010 meeting and Midwest 2010 Fall meeting for very useful comments. All shortcomings are
ours.
†Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000DR Rotterdam, the Nether-
lands; email: emaminamini@ese.eur.nl.
‡Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, P.O. Box 1738, 3000DR
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Universita´ degli Studi di Milano, Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano, Italy; CEPR and
CES–Ifo; email: facchini@ese.eur.nl.
§International Business School, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA; email: rlopez@brandeis.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Ever since detailed firm level trade data has become available, many studies have focused on the
effects of import growth on firm dynamics. For instance, Bernard et al. (2006a) show that imports
from low–wage countries have a negative impact on plant survival and growth among US firms.
Similarly, Bernard et al. (2006b) show that declining trade costs invite more foreign varieties into
the domestic market and reduce domestic sales and, accordingly, the survival probability of all
domestic firms. On the other hand, little systematic evidence exists on the role of export growth
for firm dynamics. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature.
We start by documenting the effects of export growth on a sample of Chilean manufacturing
firms during the period 1990–99. Interestingly, we find that exporting firms are more likely to
cease production, the larger are sector–wide exports. We do not find any relationship between
sector–wide exports and the survival probability of non–exporters. This finding is remarkable, as
it is at odds with the predictions of the existing theoretical literature, where the source of firm
heterogeneity is total factor productivity (TFP). In fact both the models by Melitz (2003) and
Bernard et al. (2003) predict that export growth will lead the least productive non–exporting
firms to exit the market. At the same time, there is abundant evidence suggesting that firm
heterogeneity in factor input ratios is substantial and at least as important as firm heterogeneity
in TFP.1 Still, little is known about how differences in technology as captured by differences in
factor shares affect the link between trade liberalization and firm survival.
In this paper, we develop a new theoretical model of trade in which differences in factor input
ratios are the source of heterogeneity among firms. Furthermore, we also consider how differences
in factor input ratios interact with differences in TFP to shape the selection process brought
about by trade liberalization. Thus, our analysis enriches the modeling of the production side,
highlighting the important role played by factor market competition in shaping firm selection.
We cast our discussion in a general equilibrium setting with one monopolistically competitive
sector in each country. Each firm produces a unique variety of a differentiated final good using
capital and labor. Upon market entry, firms choose the factor share parameter characterizing their
CES production function. In general, firms find it optimal to adopt different technologies to limit
factor market competition. After entry, and to start production, firms have to pay a fixed cost,
which depends on the capital intensity of their technology.
We start by characterizing the autarkic equilibrium. Since the coexistence of firms with dif-
ferent factor input ratios is ubiquitous in the real world, we restrict the technology space so that
capital and labor intensive technologies coexist in equilibrium. We show that the autarkic equi-
librium is unique in the sense that the mass of firms which choose a specific factor intensity in
production is uniquely determined by the parameters of the model.
Next, we study the trade equilibrium arising in a completely symmetric two–country world. In
1This has been documented by Bernard and Jensen (1995), Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005) and Leonardi (2007)
among others.
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a setting with fixed export costs, which implies that only the more capital intensive firms can afford
to serve the foreign market, we characterize the firm selection induced by trade liberalization. We
highlight three different effects. First, trade liberalization provides additional profit opportunities
for exporting firms. Second, it decreases domestic market shares for both exporters and non–
exporters. Third, it increases factor market competition due to the additional production for
exports. In particular, since exporters are the more capital intensive firms, the increase in factor
market competition increases (decreases) the relative price of capital (labor) and negatively affects
exporters, while it positively affects non–exporters. We also show that this effect becomes stronger,
the larger is the difference in factor intensities between the two types of firms. As a result, the
burden of increased factor market competition induced by trade liberalization falls entirely on
capital intensive exporters and some of the exporting firms might be forced to cease production.
Extending the model to multiple trading countries strengthens this result. Thus, our theoretical
framework is able to rationalize the empirical facts we have documented for the case of Chile,
which are instead at odds with the predictions of Melitz’s (2003) model.
Much of the existing literature has emphasized the role of productivity differences among firms.
How does heterogeneity in factor shares interact with heterogeneity in TFP in shaping the firm
selection process? To answer this question we extend our model and assume that within a group of
firms with identical factor input ratios, firms differ with respect to TFP. Trade liberalization now
leads to two distinct factor relocations between firms. On the one hand, factors move towards the
more productive firms within the group of capital intensive exporters. On the other hand, factors
also move between capital intensive exporters and labor intensive non–exporters. While the first
process increases sector–wide TFP, the second has a priori an ambiguous effect. Still, under
some mild assumptions, we are able to show that the larger is the difference in factor intensities
between exporters and non–exporters, the smaller is the increase in sector–wide TFP due to trade
liberalization. Thus, factor market competition dampens the positive effect on sector–wide TFP,
which has been highlighted by Melitz (2003). This allows our model to provide a rationale for the
findings of the recent literature, which has highlighted that the effects of trade liberalization on
sector–wide TFP might be only moderate (Lawless and Whelan 2008).2
Our model has identified two important channels through which export growth affects firm
selection. First, increased factor market competition is more detrimental for exporters the bigger
is the difference in factor intensities between exporters and non–exporters. Second, the increase
in TFP is smaller the larger is the difference in factor intensities between the two types of firms.
Using our Chilean dataset, we are able to show that both these mechanisms are at work, thus
highlighting the importance of modeling heterogeneity in factor shares to explain firm selection.
Our paper contributes to the literature on trade with firm heterogeneity, which has been
pioneered by Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003). The two papers in this tradition that come
closest to ours are Bernard et al. (2007) and Yeaple (2005). Bernard et al. (2007) extend the Melitz
(2003) setup by considering two factors of production and, additionally, two monopolistically
2For a recent alternative explanation see Atkeson and Burstein (2010).
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competitive sectors with different capital–labor ratios in production. In their model – differently
from ours – within each sector firms are homogeneous with respect to the capital–labor ratios,
while they still differ with respect to TFP. Bernard et al. (2007) thus are able to provide important
insights into the inter–industry and intra–industry factor relocations due to trade liberalization. By
construction, though, they do not analyze how firm heterogeneity in capital–labor ratios interacts
with globalization. This is because, within sectors, a firm’s export status only depends on its TFP,
and not on its factor shares in production.
In Yeaple (2005), on the other hand, firms choose their technology upon market entry. Labor
is the only factor of production, but workers differ with respect to their skills. The author assumes
that for each technology, a higher skill level leads to higher profits per worker, and similarly a more
advanced technology also leads to higher profits for any given skill level of the employee. Because
of these monotone relationships, trade liberalization leads to the same type of firm selection as in
Melitz (2003): the relative mass of exporters increases, whereas the relative mass of non–exporters
decreases. In our setup, on the other hand, firms produce with a standard CES technologies with
two inputs, and, as a result, we do not have a monotone relationship between factor intensities and
profits. While the paper by Yeaple (2005) provides important insights into how trade liberalization
affects workers’ skill–premia, it does not consider factor share heterogeneity across firms and thus
it cannot explain those stylized facts about trade liberalization, which refer to factor market
competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present evidence on firm
selection in the presence of export growth for Chile. Section 3 lies out our model, and in section 4
we solve for the autarkic equilibrium. In section 5 we consider the effects of trade liberalization in
a symmetric two–country setting. Section 6 extends the model to N countries, whereas section 7
combines our setting with the standard Melitz–type heterogeneity in TFP. In section 8 we provide
an empirical evaluation of our model. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
To introduce our analysis, we use a well–known plant–level dataset on the manufacturing sector
of Chile, which has been employed by several previous studies, focusing on the period 1990–1999.3
We choose this period since in this decade the Chilean government signed several free trade
agreements, which significantly reduced the trade barriers faced by Chilean exporters.4 The data
come from the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries carried out by the National Institute
of Statistics of Chile.5
Figure 1 highlights an interesting pattern: on average, exporting firms are less likely to survive,
3This dataset has been used, among others, by Pavcnik (2002), Pavcnik (2003) and Kasahara and Rodrigue
(2008).
4During the 1990s Chile established free trade agreements with Canada, Central America, Mercosur and Mexico.
It also signed partial trade liberalization agreements with Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
5See appendix A for a description of the dataset.
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Figure 1: Three–year average survival probability and sectoral exports
the larger are the sector–wide export volumes. At the same time, non–exporters appear not to be
affected. In order to analyze how export growth affects different types of firms in a more systematic
fashion, we estimate the following probit model, separately for exporters and non–exporters:
Pr(Sij,t+τ = 1) = Φ [β1 log(Expjt) + λ
′Ωijt + δj + δt] (1)
where Sij,t+τ equals one if plant i operating in sector j survived from year t to year t + τ . Φ
is the standard normal distribution function, Expjt measures the exports of sector j in year t,
Ωijt is a vector of plant characteristics that includes size (measured by the log of employment),
total factor productivity (in logs),6 age (in logs), skill intensity,7 and a set of dummy variables for
plants that import intermediate inputs, plants with foreign ownership, and plants that use foreign
technology licenses. The variables δj and δt are respectively 3–digit sector and year fixed effects
that control for unobserved heterogeneity at the sector level and over time. Estimating a regression
with plant level data, but including sector time–varying variables may underestimate the standard
errors (Moulton 1990). To correct for this problem, standard errors are clustered at the 3–digit
sector–year level. All specifications also include a measure of multinational corporations presence,
6Total factor productivity is the residual of a regression that estimates a Cobb–Douglas production function for
each 3–digit industry using the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and later modified by Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), which corrects for the simultaneity bias associated with the fact that productivity is not observed
by the econometrician, but it may be observed by the firm. In some cases the production functions were estimated
at the 2–digit level due to the small number of observations available for some industries at the 3–digit level of
disaggregation. We estimate the production function separately for exporters and non–exporters to account for the
fact that these two types of firms produce with different factor intensities.
7Skill intensity is the ratio between skilled workers’ wages and total wages.
4
which is calculated as the fraction of value added accounted by plants with foreign ownership at
the 3–digit level.8 Some specifications also include a measure of the size of the sector (either total
employment or total value added).
A positive sign for β1 would suggest that a firm is more likely to survive τ periods ahead if
sector–wide exports increase. The analysis focuses on three–year survival rates (τ = 3), but we
have run the same specification using one– and five–year survival rates obtaining similar results.
Table 1 presents our findings for both exporters and non–exporters. Consistent with previous
studies,9 larger plants, older plants, plants that are more productive, and those that use imported
intermediate inputs are more likely to survive. Plants with foreign ownership, on the other hand,
are more likely to exit, which is consistent with the findings of Alvarez and Go¨rg (2009). As in
Bernard et al. (2006a) the share of total wages paid to skilled workers is negatively correlated
with plant survival, but only for the case of non–exporters. The estimates for the dummy for
plants that use foreign technology licenses are not statistically significant. Finally, the presence of
multinational corporations in the sector does not have any significant effect on survival.
The main variable of interest is the estimate of the effect of sector–wide exports. Table 1
shows that, for the case of exporters, higher export volumes at the sectoral level are negatively
correlated with a plant’s survival probability. Furthermore, this result is statistically significant at
the conventional levels in all specifications and is robust to the inclusion of controls for the sector
size (employment and value added). It is possible, however, that the number of exporters (or the
respective survival rate) might influence sector–wide exports. If this is the case then the estimates
in Table 1 may suffer from an endogeneity bias. To address this concern, we instrument exports
using a measure of the level of foreign income relevant for each 3–digit sector.10 The exclusion
restriction, in this case, requires foreign income to be correlated with exports but not correlated
with any other factors that affect the exporters’ survival probability. This assumption is likely
to be satisfied as changes in foreign income directly affect the demand for Chilean products and,
thus, exports, but do not affect the probability of survival of exporters other than through exports.
The instrument, on the other hand, is likely to be correlated with the level of exports. Indeed, the
estimate for the instrument in the first stage is positive and significant, and it passes the F–test
for the exclusion restriction (see Staiger and Stock 1997). As shown in Table A4 in the appendix,
this IV procedure confirms our previous results, i.e. that an exporting plant’s survival probability
is negatively correlated with sector–level exports.
This finding is puzzling in the light of the existing theoretical literature, which, following Melitz
(2003), has focused on firm heterogeneity in total factor productivity. In fact, in a standard setting
a´ la Melitz, an increase in exports at the sectoral level leads exporting plants to become larger,
8As a robustness check, the analysis also uses inflows of FDI at the 2–digit level. The results are not significantly
affected when this alternative measure is used.
9See, for example, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) and Lo´pez (2006).
10This is computed as a weighted average of the per capita GDP of the 15 main export destination countries
of each sector. The 15 main destination countries in each sector receive the majority of Chilean exports. Their
share in total exports of the sector ranges from 81.2% to 99.5%. The average share across all sectors is 92%. See
appendix B for details on how this variable is computed.
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without reducing their number. In other words, exporting plants do not “die” due to the increase
in overall export volumes. Instead, the adjustment takes place among the non–exporting plants,
among which the least productive ones exit the market. These results hold also in the multi–factor
extensions of the Melitz (2003) model, like the one proposed by Bernard et al. (2007), because
all firms within a sector are assumed to use inputs in the same proportions. Importantly, in our
data, also this prediction is not supported. In fact, as shown in the second panel of Table 1 (and
Table A4) non–exporting plants are not affected if sector–wide exports grow.
To account for this remarkable pattern, we need to develop a richer model, which will focus on
how competition in factor markets affects the firm selection brought about by increased exports.
3 Model setup
Home’s economy is characterized by a representative consumer and a single monopolistically com-
petitive industry. We start by describing the demand side, and proceed then to consider produc-
tion, focusing first on the technology available to the firms and then on market entry.
The preferences of the representative consumer are given by a CES utility function of the type
U =
[∫
υ∈Υ
q(υ)
σ−1
σ dυ
] σ
σ−1
. (2)
The parameter σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties, and Υ is the set
of available goods, indexed by υ. The representative consumer is endowed with a fixed amounts
of capital K (human or physical) and labor L, which we assume to be perfectly mobile within a
country, but immobile between countries. The consumer’s overall income is given by
I = wL+ rK, (3)
where w is the wage rate and r is the return to capital. Utility maximization subject to the budget
constraint leads to the demand for each individual variety, which is given by
q(υ) = IP σ−1p(υ)−σ, (4)
where P =
[∫
υ∈Υ p(υ)
1−σdυ
] 1
1−σ is the price index, which is dual to the utility function.
Turning to the supply side of the economy, there is a continuum of potentially active firms,
each of which produces a different variety of the same good, combining capital K and labor L
according to the following CES production function:
q(φ) =
[
φ1−αKα + (1− φ)1−αLα]1/α , 0 < α < 1 (5)
where q(φ) is the firm’s output and φ ∈ [0, 1] a factor share parameter characterizing the technol-
ogy. In the remainder of the paper we index firms by φ. The elasticity of substitution between
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inputs is given by ς = 1
1−α . In order to simplify the calculations and to obtain explicit solutions
for the sector–wide average technology parameters, we assume ς = σ. Thus, σ will denote both
the elasticity of substitution between inputs in production and between varieties in consumption.
If a firm decides to produce, it faces a fixed production cost and a constant marginal cost c(φ).
The latter is given by
c(φ) =
[
φr1−σ + (1− φ)w1−σ]1/(1−σ) . (6)
Clearly, as long as r 6= w, firms choosing different values of φ face different marginal costs.
Production requires a fixed cost which takes the following form:
F (φ) = c(φ)f(φ). (7)
This structure of fixed costs is common in two–factor trade models (e.g., Markusen and Venables
2000) and implies that firms have to pay for the fixed input requirement f(φ) in terms of their
final output.11 We assume that f(φi) > f(φj) if φi > φj, i.e. the more capital intensive is the
technology, the higher is the fixed input requirement.
The market entry process takes the following form. Ex ante, all firms are identical. Market
entry is costless. After entry, firms have the choice between two different technologies: a capital
intensive technology, characterized by φK , and a labor intensive technology, characterized by φL,
with φK > φL. Firms maximize profits, which are given by
pi(φi) =
Ip(φi)
−σ
P 1−σ
[p(φi)− c(φi)]− c(φi)f(φi), i = K, L, (8)
and the resulting output price is given by p(φi) =
σ
σ−1 c(φi).
4 Autarkic equilibrium
We choose labor as the nume´raire and set w = 1. As a result, r denotes the relative price of
capital. In equilibrium factor markets clear. Applying Shephard’s Lemma, this implies:
L =
∑
i=L,K
aLi [q(φi) + fi] ηi (9)
K =
∑
i=L,K
aKi [q(φi) + fi] ηi. (10)
ηi denotes the mass of firms of type i active in the market, whereas the terms aLi ≡ (1− φi) c(φi)σ
and aKi ≡ φir−σc(φi)σ are, respectively, the unit labor and capital requirements for variety i.
Furthermore, let f(φi) ≡ fi in order to save on notation.
11Alternatively, we could assume that firms have to pay for f(φ) in terms of labor, i.e. F (φ) = wf(φ), or in
terms of capital, i.e. F (φ) = rf(φ). Our results are robust to these alternative specifications of F (φ).
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Equations 9 and 10 can be used to perform some useful comparative statics exercises. We start
by considering the relationship between firms’ production and factor prices:
Lemma 1 An exogenous increase in the aggregate production of the capital (labor) intensive firms
increases (decreases) the relative price of capital r.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, notice that aKK
aLK
> 1 and aLL
aKL
> 1 since φK > φL.
Second, dividing equations 9 and 10 by each other and considering that q(φi)
σ−1 = IP
σ−1p(φi)−σ = fi
in general equilibrium leads to:
L
K
=
aLKq(φK)ηK + aLLq(φL)ηL
aKKq(φK)ηK + aKLq(φL)ηL︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Θ
=
(1− φK)ηK + (1− φL)ηL
r−σ(φKηK + φLηL)
. (11)
The term Θ, denotes relative labor demand in the economy. The impact of an increase in aggregate
production of capital intensive firms (q(φK)ηK) on Θ can be calculated as follows:
∂Θ
∂[q(φK)ηK ]
=
q(φL)ηL(aLKaKL − aLLaKK)
[aKKq(φK)ηK + aKLq(φL)ηL]2
. (12)
∂Θ
∂[q(φK)ηK ]
< 0 since aLKaKL − aLLaKK < 0. Thus, an increase in q(φK)ηK decreases relative labor
demand. Third, since L
K
is exogenously given, r has to adjust so that equation 11 holds again
after the exogenous increase in q(φK)ηK . An increase in r increases aLi, while it decreases aKi,
i.e. the production of each variety becomes more labor intensive. Furthermore, an increase in r
increases p(φK)
p(φL)
and, thus, it decreases q(φK)
q(φL)
. An increase in r therefore ceteris paribus increases
relative labor demand Θ, so that equation 11 holds again.
A second comparative static result is given by:
Lemma 2 An increase in the relative price of capital increases the profits of labor intensive firms,
while it decreases the profits of capital intensive firms.
Proof. Substituting the terms for I, P and p(φK) into equation 8 and calculating the partial
derivative of pi(φK) with respect to r leads to:
∂pi(φK)
∂r
=
K(1− φK)− LφKr−σ
σP 1−σ
+
(
L+ rK
)
(1− σ)r−σηL (φK − φL)
σP 2−2σ
< 0 (13)
∂pi(φK)
∂r
is negative since K
L
< φK
1−φK r
−σ, which follows from equation 11, φK > φL and σ > 1. It
can be shown along the same lines that the profits of labor intensive firms increase with r.
The intuition for lemma 2 is as follows. An increase in the relative price of capital ceteris
paribus increases the relative price of the capital intensive goods. This shifts demand away from
capital intensive goods and towards labor intensive ones, leading to higher (lower) profits for the
labor (capital) intensive firms.
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Furthermore, since market entry is costless, in the autarkic equilibrium each firm’s profits are
driven to zero. As firms can choose among two different technologies, a zero profit condition has
to be formulated for each of them separately, and is given by
IP σ−1p(φi)−σ = q(φi) = (σ − 1) fi, with i = L, K. (14)
Using lemma 1 and 2, we are now ready to establish our first proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique and stable autarkic equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, equation 11 can be rewritten as follows:
L
K
r−σ =
(1− φK) + (1− φL) ηLηK
φK + φL
ηL
ηK
(15)
Equation 15 shows that the relationship between r and ηL
ηK
as it results from the factor market
clearing condition is negative. Second, taking the ratio of the zero profit conditions for capital
and labor intensive firms (equation 14) we have
q (φK)
q (φL)
=
(φKr
1−σ + 1− φK)−σ/(1−σ)
(φLr1−σ + 1− φL)−σ/(1−σ)
=
fK
fL
. (16)
Equation 16 can be solved to determine the relative price of capital r in the autarkic equilibrium
(subscript a):
ra =

(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK −
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
φL

1/(1−σ)
. (17)
Notice that ra is defined only if φK −
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
φL > 0, i.e. if
φK
φL
>
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
. If, in contrast,
φK
φL
<
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
, firms only choose the labor intensive technology. Since we focus on a general
equilibrium with both types of firms active, we will consider only the case of φK
φL
>
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
in the following. Furthermore, notice that ra < 1 since fK > fL. Thus, the capital intensive
firms realize higher revenues in general equilibrium, which are used to pay for the higher fixed
input requirement fK . Finally, equation 17 also shows that ra does not depend on
ηL
ηK
. Thus,
substituting equation 17 into equation 15 we can solve for ηL
ηK
. Once ra and
ηL
ηK
are known, we can
determine all other variables of the model.
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to equation 15 as the relative factor market clearing
condition (FMC). Equation 17 determines instead the relative price of capital, given that both
types of firms are active, and we will refer to it as the price of capital condition (PC). In the left
panel of Figure 2, we depict the two curves. Their intersection establishes the relative price of
9
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Figure 2: Autarkic equilibrium
capital r and the relative mass of labor intensive firms ηL
ηK
in the autarkic equilibrium. Once ηL
ηK
has been determined, we can also obtain the absolute number of active firms by using one of the
two zero profit conditions. This is done in the right panel of the figure.
Finally, it is useful to calculate the average capital share parameter over all active firms φ˜:
φ˜ =
φKηK + φLηL
ηK + ηL
(18)
Notice that, as shown in appendix C, an industry with ηL+ ηK homogenous firms producing with
the capital share parameter φ˜ leads to the same aggregate outcomes as an industry with ηL and ηK
heterogeneous firms, each producing with the capital share parameters φL and φK , respectively.
5 Free trade equilibrium
In this section, we extend our analysis to a two–country setting to study the effect of a bilateral
trade liberalization. To keep our analysis simple, we compare the autarky with the free trade, and
assume zero transport costs. We study the firm selection in each country, which is due to increased
competition on goods and factor markets. The former is induced by the inflow of foreign varieties.
The latter is instead the result of increased production by exporters. To provide intuition for
our results, we consider first the impact of increased competition on goods markets, and then
turn to increased competition on factor markets. Thus, we first focus on how the inflow of foreign
varieties influences the mass of the two types of firms, holding factor prices fixed. We then consider
the full general equilibrium effects with endogenously determined factor prices. Throughout our
discussion, we assume that production factors, are immobile across countries.
Home and Foreign are assumed to be completely symmetric. Utility maximization in Foreign
10
results in the following demand function for a variety produced in Home:
qF (φ) = IFP
σ−1
F p(φ)
−σ, (19)
where the subscript F denotes foreign variables. In order to export, a domestic firm faces a fixed
cost given by:
FX = c(φ)fX . (20)
We make the following assumption on the magnitude of the export cost parameter fX :
IFP
σ−1
F p (φL)
−σ < fX(σ − 1) and IFP σ−1F p (φK)−σ ≥ fX(σ − 1). (21)
This assumption implies that only capital intensive firms will earn non–negative profits by serving
the foreign market, whereas no labor intensive firm will find it optimal to export.12 Total demand
for a domestically produced capital intensive variety increases to
q (φK) + qF (φK) = 2IP
σ−1p (φK)
−σ (22)
and the aggregate price index decreases to
P =
[
2ηKp (φK)
1−σ + ηLp (φL)
1−σ]1/(1−σ) (23)
following trade liberalization. For labor intensive firms, trade liberalization ceteris paribus does
not affect the supply decision and the zero profit condition is still given by 14. On the other
hand, trade liberalization affects the supply decision of capital intensive firms and their zero profit
condition becomes:
2q (φK) = (σ − 1)(fK + fX). (24)
Dividing equations 24 and 14 by each other and remembering that q(φi) = IP
σ−1p(φi)−σ, we can
solve for r in the free trade equilibrium (subscript ft):
rft =
[
Ψ(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK −ΨφL
]1/(1−σ)
, (25)
with Ψ =
(
fK+fX
2fL
)(σ−1)/σ
. We will refer to equation 25 as the PC–equation in the free trade
equilibrium. Finally, considering also the additional factor demand due to production for exports
12Remember that profits from exporting are given by pi(φi) = IFPσ−1F p(φi)
1−σσ−1 − c(φi)fX for i ∈ {K,L}.
Substituting p(φi) = σσ−1c(φi) into this equation leads to the conditions in equation 21. Furthermore, remember
that r < 1 in equilibrium, which implies p(φL) > p(φK).
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leads to the following FMC condition under free trade:
L
K
r−σ =
2(1− φK) + (1− φL) ηLηK
2φK + φL
ηL
ηK
. (26)
Summarizing our results so far we obtain:
Lemma 3 Compared to autarky, a bilateral trade liberalization has the following consequences:
i) the aggregate price index P decreases in each country due to the availability of additional
varieties from abroad; the decrease in P ceteris paribus decreases the profits of exporting and
non–exporting firms and reflects an increase in goods market competition;
ii) capital intensive firms increase their production due to additional profit opportunities abroad;
iii) the relative price of capital r increases due to additional production by capital intensive ex-
porters; the increase in r ceteris paribus decreases the profits of capital intensive firms and
increases the profits of labor intensive firms.
Proof. Parts i) and ii) follow from equations 22 and 23. Part iii) follows from lemma 1 and
lemma 2.
Notice that it is a priori ambiguous whether trade liberalization leads to a firm selection in
favor of or against either type of firms, i.e. whether ηL
ηK
increases or decreases. The additional
availability of foreign varieties affects both capital and labor intensive firms negatively, and ceteris
paribus drives both types of firms out of the market. At the same time, the increased profit
opportunities abroad affect capital intensive firms positively, ceteris paribus leading to additional
entry of this type of firms. Finally, the increased competition on factor markets, which is reflected
by the increase in r, affects capital intensive firms negatively and labor intensive firms positively,
ceteris paribus leading to exit (entry) of capital (labor) intensive firms.
The net effect of trade liberalization on the two types of firms crucially depends on the difference
in capital share parameters φK−φL. In the following, we will refer to φK−φL as the factor intensity
gap between exporters and non–exporters. The factor intensity gap determines (i) the extent to
which r increases with trade liberalization and (ii) the extent to which firms are affected by the
increase in r, and its role is characterized in the following
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold value Φ for the factor intensity gap such that bilateral
trade liberalization leads to the following pattern of firm selection:
i) if φK − φL > Φ, ηLηK increases, i.e. the relative mass of non–exporters increases;
ii) if φK − φL < Φ, ηLηK decreases, i.e. the relative mass of non–exporters decreases.
In general, the larger is φK − φL, the more detrimental (beneficial) is trade liberalization for a
single exporting (non–exporting) firm.
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Figure 3: The role of the factor intensity gap
Proof. See appendix D.
Figure 3 illustrates the firm selection with trade liberalization. ( ηL
ηK
)ft stands for the relative mass
of labor intensive firms under free trade, while ( ηL
ηK
)a stands for the relative mass of labor intensive
firms under autarky. The minimum technological difference, which is denoted by (φK − φL)min, is
defined as that difference φK − φL, which leads to (ηK)a = 0. In appendix D we prove that the
relationship between ( ηL
ηK
)ft − ( ηLηK )a and φK − φL is positive.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is as follows. First, the increase in r brought about by
trade liberalization is larger, the larger is the difference φK − φL. Second, for a given increase in
the relative price of capital r the losses (gains) for the capital (labor) intensive firms are larger,
the larger (smaller) is φK − φL. Thus, we can conclude that labor (capital) intensive firms will
unambiguously gain (lose) from trade liberalization and firms of this type will enter (exit) the
market if the factor intensity gap is sufficiently large.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of trade liberalization on the mass of firms active in equilibrium.
The left panel shows that, starting from the autarkic equilibrium Ea, trade liberalization shifts
the PC curve upwards. This results from new profit opportunities abroad for capital intensive
firms, which requires an increase in the relative price of capital r for the free entry conditions to
hold again. Trade liberalization also leads to increased competition in factor markets, which shifts
the FMC curve upwards. In fact, if relative demand for capital increases, the relative price of
this factor must also increase to re–establish factor market clearing. The free trade equilibrium is
illustrated by point Eft, which, consistently with the empirical evidence discussed in section 2, is
drawn such that the relative mass of capital intensive firms decreases.
The right panel of the same figure captures also the role played by the increased availability of
foreign varieties. We keep factor prices constant for the moment in order to separate the effects
of increased factor market competition from those of the influx of foreign varieties. Starting from
13
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Figure 4: Trade liberalization
the autarkic equilibrium Ea, increased availability of foreign varieties and new profit opportunities
abroad make the line illustrating the zero profit conditions for capital intensive firms shift inwards
and become steeper (dotted line). Allowing factor prices to adjust (r increases) flattens the curve
and makes it shift inwards. The new equilibrium point is indicated by Eft. In general, the mass
of capital intensive firms ηK decreases, whereas ηL can increase or decrease.
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Importantly, notice that in our model a capital intensive firm will never react to the increase
in the relative price of capital by exiting the foreign market, while still serving the domestic one.
If factor market competition is sufficiently strong as to induce some exporting firms to leave the
foreign market, these firms will cease production completely, i.e. they will exit also the domestic
market. The reason for this result lies in our market entry procedure. Since firms do not have any
uncertainty about their technology and market entry is free, each firm realizes zero profits on the
domestic market in the autarkic equilibrium, i.e. pi(φ) = 0 (see equation 14). Thus, an increase
in the relative price of capital due to trade liberalization negatively affects the profits of capital
intensive firms in the domestic market, and only if the firm is able to make positive profits from
exporting, it might be able to survive.
This finding is in contrast with the standard results in the literature (see Melitz 2003, among
others). In these models an increase in sector–wide exports increases the wage rate, which decreases
profits of all firms proportionately and leads the least productive firms to exit the market, whereas
the marginal exporting firms become non–exporters.
It is interesting to determine the effect of trade liberalization on the industry–wide average
capital share parameter φ˜. This is done in the following
Proposition 3 Compared to autarky, trade liberalization leads to an increase in the average
industry–wide capital share parameter.
13Appendix E formally derives the shifts of the zero profit condition in the right panel.
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Figure 5: The effect of an increase in N
Proof. See appendix F .
6 The N country case
We now extend our analysis to the case of N ≥ 2 symmetric countries, which are freely trading
among each other. We focus on a trade liberalization experiment that involves all countries
simultaneously.
Compared to the two–country case, the aggregate output of a capital intensive firm now in-
creases to
Nq(φK) = NIP
σ−1 [p(φK)]
−σ , N ≥ 2, (27)
with trade liberalization. The zero profit condition for a capital intensive firm is now given by
q(φK) =
(σ − 1)[fK + (N − 1)fX ]
N
, (28)
whereas the corresponding condition for labor intensive firms is still given by equation 14. Dividing
equation 28 by equation 14 and solving for the relative price of capital, we obtain the N country
version of the free trade PC–curve:
rft =
[
Ξ(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK − ΞφL
]1/(1−σ)
, (29)
with Ξ =
[
fK+(N−1)fX
fL
1
N
](σ−1)/σ
. The relative factor market clearing condition (FMC) for the N
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country case can be solved directly for ηL
ηK
:
ηL
ηK
=
1− φK − r−σ LKφK
r−σ L
K
φL − (1− φL)
N. (30)
We can now study the effect of an increase in N on the firm selection induced by trade liber-
alization, starting from the initial equilibrium E1 (see figure 5). Consider the PC–curve. It is
straightforward to show that as N increases it shifts upwards (the thicker black line). Intuitively,
since N ceteris paribus increases the profits of capital intensive firms, r has to increase as well
for the zero profit condition of capital intensive firms to hold. Remember from lemma 2 that the
capital intensive firms’ profits decrease as r increases. Furthermore, in the limit, as N approaches
infinity, r converges to the following value
rft =

(
fX
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK −
(
fX
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
φL

1/(1−σ)
. (31)
and rft < 1 if fX > fL (see appendix G for the proof).
Turning now to the FMC–curve, as N becomes larger, the curve shifts rightward, i.e. ηL
ηK
increases for a given r (see equation 30). This is because as the number of trading partners becomes
larger, aggregate relative capital demand ceteris paribus increases. Thus, the new equilibrium is
given by E2. Importantly, in equilibrium the relationship between
ηL
ηK
and N is linear. Thus, if N
goes to infinity, ηL
ηK
goes to infinity as well.14
Consider now right panel of figure 5. An increase in the number of trading partners N shifts the
zero profit condition further to the left and the curve becomes steeper. Thus, we can summarize
our main finding for the N country case in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 As the number N of trading partners becomes sufficiently large, trade liberalization
always leads to a decrease in the mass of capital intensive firms ηK, and to an increase in the mass
of labor intensive firms ηL.
Proof. See appendix G.
7 Adding heterogeneity in TFP
A large empirical literature has documented the existence of substantial firm heterogeneity in TFP
within a narrowly defined sector (Bernard and Jensen 1995, Alvarez and Lo´pez 2005 etc.), and
thus it is important to study how heterogeneity in factor shares interacts with heterogeneity in
14Notice that r is bounded from above by 1. Thus, if N is sufficiently large, trade liberalization always increases
ηL
ηK
, irrespective of the magnitude of fX .
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TFP in shaping firm selection with trade liberalization. To keep the analysis general, we focus on
the case of N ≥ 2 symmetric trading partners in the free trade situation.
To incorporate firm heterogeneity in TFP we follow Melitz (2003) and modify the market entry
procedure. In particular, after having chosen the technology parameter φL or φK and to actually
enter the market, firms have to pay a sunk market entry fee fE. Payment of this allows firms to
draw their TFP parameter A from a common and exogenously given probability distribution with
support [1,∞), density g(A) and cumulative density G(A).15 Since the random TFP parameter
reflects a firm’s uncertainty about, e.g., how well workers perform or how consumers evaluate a
variety, it is reasonable to assume that a firm learns its TFP after it has chosen its capital share
parameter. The production function of a firm with capital share parameter φ is now given by:
q(φ,A) = A
[
φ1−αKα + (1− φ)1−α Lα]1/α , 0 < α < 1. (32)
The corresponding marginal cost function c(φ,A) results as:
c (φ,A) =
1
A
(
φr1−σ + 1− φ)1/(1−σ) , σ > 1. (33)
As in Melitz (2003), we assume that TFP does not influence the fixed cost. We therefore choose
the following specification
F (φ) = Ac(φi, A)fi =
(
φir
1−σ + 1− φi
)1/(1−σ)
fi, i = K, L. (34)
A firm’s current period profits can then be expressed as
pi (φi, A) =
Ip (φi, A)
1−σ
P 1−σσ
− Ac (φi, A) fi. (35)
Again, we assume that firms pay for fE with their final output, so that the sunk market entry
costs for a firm with capital share parameter φi, i = L,K, are given by:
FE (φi) = Ac (φi, A) fE =
(
φir
1−σ + 1− φi
)1/(1−σ)
fE. (36)
Notice that TFP does not affect the sunk entry cost either. We can now define the minimum
productivity level A∗i , such that a firm starts producing. A
∗
i is determined by the following zero
cutoff profit condition:
IP σ−1p (φi, A∗i )
−σ = q (A∗i , φi) = A
∗
i (σ − 1)fi, i = K,L. (37)
Given the threshold TFP parameter A∗i , free entry implies that the ex–ante expected profits from
15Notice that without a sunk entry fee, firms could enter and exit the market costlessly, and thus draw their
productivity parameter repeatedly, until they obtain the highest possible productivity level.
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market entry are equal to zero. Thus, the free entry condition can be written as follows:
[1−G(A∗i )]
∫ ∞
A∗i
pi(φi, A)µ(A)dA = FE(φi), i = L,K, (38)
where µ(A) = g(A)
1−G(A∗i ) . The first term on the left hand side of equation 38 represents the probability
that a firm of type i starts producing after entry. The second term describes the average profits
of active firms. The term on the right hand side represents the sunk entry cost.
The following lemma characterizes the threshold TFP parameter in the autarkic equilibrium:
Lemma 4 The threshold TFP parameter A∗a,i in the autarkic equilibrium is given by the solution
to the following equation
[
1−G (A∗a,i)]
(A˜a,i
A∗a,i
)σ−1
− 1
 = fE
fi
, i = L, K, (39)
where
(
1
A˜a,i
)1−σ
≡ ∫∞
A∗a,i
(
1
A
)1−σ
µ(A)dA.
Proof. See appendix H.
Notice that A∗a,i depends only on σ, fE, fi and g(A). Thus, A
∗
a,i is independent from A
∗
a,j, i 6= j.
To determine the autarkic equilibrium, we proceed as in section 4, and construct the modified
version of the price of capital curve (PC) and the factor market clearing condition (FMC). To
derive the autarkic PC–curve under the presence of firm heterogeneity in TFP, we take the ratio
of the zero cutoff profit conditions for the two types of firms (equation 37), and solve this for ra:
ra =

(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ (A∗a,K
A∗a,L
)(1−σ)2/−σ
(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK −
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ (A∗a,K
A∗a,L
)(1−σ)2/−σ
φL

1/(1−σ)
. (40)
Notice that if A∗a,K = A
∗
a,L equation 40 simplifies to equation 17, i.e. we are back to our standard
case. To derive the FMC condition, we need to consider that, compared to the baseline model,
an increase in productivity decreases the unit factor requirements, whereas it increases aggregate
output since the price of each variety declines. The modified FMC condition becomes:
L
K
=
(1− φK) A˜σ−1a,K + (1− φL) A˜σ−1a,L ηLηK
φKr−σA˜σ−1a,K + φLr−σA˜
σ−1
a,L
ηL
ηK
. (41)
and we refer the reader to appendix I for the derivations. Combining the PC and the FMC
conditions we can determine the autarkic equilibrium, which is characterized in the following
Proposition 5 There exists a unique, stable autarkic equilibrium with firm heterogeneity in factor
shares and TFP.
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Proof. See appendix J.
We are now ready to determine the industry–wide average capital share parameter φ˜ and the
industry–wide average TFP parameter A˜ in the autarkic equilibrium (subscript a):
φ˜a =
φKA˜
σ−1
a,K + φLA˜
σ−1
a,L (
ηL
ηK
)a
A˜σ−1a,K + A˜
σ−1
a,L (
ηL
ηK
)a
, A˜a =
[
A˜σ−1a,K + A˜
σ−1
a,K (
ηL
ηK
)a
1 + ( ηL
ηK
)a
]1/(σ−1)
.
Notice that an industry with ηL+ηK homogeneous firms, each producing with technology parame-
ters φ˜a and A˜a, leads to the same aggregate outcome as an industry with ηL and ηK heterogeneous
firms, each producing with parameters φL, A˜a,L, φK and A˜a,K , respectively (see appendix K).
Now, we consider the effects of a multilateral trade liberalization (i.e. a movement from autarky
to free trade) among N countries. As before, we assume that the fixed exporting cost fX is such
that fX ≥ fL. We can now determine a second threshold value A∗Xi, which represents the minimum
productivity level that enables a firm to serve the N foreign markets after liberalization. This
threshold is determined by the following zero cutoff profit condition:
IFP
σ−1
F p(φi, A
∗
Xi)
−σ = q(φi, A∗Xi) = A
∗
Xi(σ − 1)fX . (42)
Equation 42 implies the following. First, A∗Xi ≥ A∗i since fX ≥ fi. Thus, not all firms which
serve the domestic market export as well. Second, A∗XL > A
∗
XK , i.e. labor intensive firms need a
higher productivity level in order to be able to export, compared to capital intensive firms. This
follows from the fact that p(φK , A) < p(φL, A) for any given TFP parameter A. Thus, a higher
TFP parameter has to compensate for the otherwise higher marginal costs of labor intensive firms.
Finally, dividing equations 37 and 42 by each other and solving for A∗Xi leads to:
A∗Xi = A
∗
i
(
fi
fXi
)1/(1−σ)
. (43)
The free entry condition has to be modified to account for the additional ex–ante expected export
profits, and becomes
[1−G(A∗i )]
∫ ∞
A∗i
pi(φi, A)µ(A)dA+ (N − 1) [1−G(A∗Xi)]
∫ ∞
A∗Xi
piX(φi, A)µX(A)dA = FE(φi), (44)
where µX(A) =
g(A)
1−G(A∗Xi) . The term 1 − G(A
∗
Xi) stands for the probability that a firm of type
i will be exporting after market entry. The term
∫∞
A∗Xi
pi(φi, A)µX(A)dA stands for the average
export profits over all exporting firms. Notice that 1−G(A∗XK) > 1−G(A∗XL) since A∗XL > A∗XL.
Thus, if a firm has chosen a capital intensive technology, it is more likely to become an exporter,
compared to having chosen a labor intensive technology.
Lemma 5 characterizes the threshold TFP parameter for firms of type i, i = L,K, in the free
trade equilibrium and the impact of trade liberalization on the threshold TFP parameter:
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Lemma 5 The threshold TFP parameter A∗ft,i, i = L,K, in the free trade equilibrium is given by
the solution to the following equation
[
1−G (A∗ft,i)]
(A˜ft,i
A∗ft,i
)σ−1
− 1
+ (N − 1) [1−G (A∗Xi)]
(A˜Xi
A∗Xi
)σ−1
− 1
 fX
fi
=
fE
fi
, (45)
where
(
1
A˜Xi
)1−σ
≡ ∫∞
A∗Xi
(
1
A
)1−σ
µX(A)dA. Trade liberalization increases A
∗
ft,i.
Proof. See appendix L.
Furthermore, in the following we will assume that the TFP parameter follows a Pareto distribution
with density g(A) = k
Ak+1
and shape parameter k ≥ σ − 1. Thus, we can formulate lemma 6:16
Lemma 6 The increases in A∗K due to trade liberalization is larger than the increase in A
∗
L.
Furthermore, the increase in A˜K due to trade liberalization is larger than the increases in A˜L.
Proof. See appendix M.
To understand the intuition behind lemma 5 and 6, notice that trade liberalization increases
ex–ante expected profits and thus triggers additional entry of both types of firms. Competition
becomes stronger, which implies that only the more productive firms of either type will survive.
Since the share of exporters among capital intensive firms is larger, new entry of capital intensive
firms exceeds new entry of labor intensive firms. Thus, the TFP improvement among capital
intensive firms is larger than the TFP improvement among labor intensive firms.
Notice though that the PC curve is only indirectly affected by trade liberalization since it has
been derived from the zero cutoff profit condition for the supply to the domestic market. The
increase in the ratio of TFP thresholds
A∗K
A∗L
due to trade liberalization will shift the PC curve
upwards.17 As for the relative factor market clearing condition, following trade liberalization it
takes the following form:
L
K
r−σ =
(1− φK)A˜σ−1ft,K + (1− φL) 1+sL1+sK A˜
σ−1
ft,L
ηL
ηK
φKA˜
σ−1
ft,K + φL
1+sL
1+sK
A˜σ−1ft,L
ηL
ηK
, (46)
with si ≡ 1−G(A
∗
Xi)
1−G(A∗i ) denoting the share of exporters among firms of type i. Notice that trade
liberalization increases A˜σ−1K relative to A˜
σ−1
L , while
1+sL
1+sK
< 1. Thus, relative capital demand
ceteris paribus increases, which shifts the FMC–curve to the right.
The extent of the factor relocation between capital and labor intensive firms depends, as in
section 5, on the factor intensity gap φK−φL between exporters and non–exporters. We can show
that ηL
ηK
increases (decreases) with trade liberalization if φK − φL is at its maximum (minimum)
16Notice that the assumption k ≥ σ−1 guarantees that the average TFP parameters A˜σ−1i and A˜σ−1Xi are defined.
Axtell (2001) and Luttmer (2007), among others, have shown that a Pareto–distribution describes appropriately
the distribution of TFP across firms in manufacturing.
17This follows immediately from equation 40.
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level. Furthermore, trade liberalization is more detrimental (beneficial) for the exporting (non–
exporting) firms, the larger is φK − φL (see appendix N).
Finally, the industry–wide average technology parameters in the free trade equilibrium are
given by (see appendix O):
φ˜ft =
φKA˜
σ−1
ft,K + φL
1+sL
1+sK
A˜σ−1ft,L(
ηL
ηK
)ft
A˜σ−1ft,K +
1+sL
1+sK
A˜σ−1ft,L(
ηL
ηK
)ft
, A˜ft =
[
A˜σ−1ft,K +
1+sL
1+sK
A˜σ−1ft,L(
ηL
ηK
)ft
1 + 1+sL
1+sK
( ηL
ηK
)ft
]1/(σ−1)
.
Comparing A˜a with A˜ft leads to proposition 6
Proposition 6 Trade liberalization increases the sector–wide average TFP parameter A˜. The
increase in A˜ is larger, the smaller is the factor intensity gap φK − φL.
Proof. See appendix P.
The intuition for proposition 6 is as follows: on the one hand, as shown in lemma 5, the increase
in A∗i and A˜i, i = L,K, does not depend on the factor intensity gap φK − φL. On the other hand,
proposition 2 has shown that the factor relocation between exporters and non–exporters depends
on the factor intensity gap. Since the increase in A˜L with trade liberalization is smaller than the
increase in A˜K , an increase (a decrease) in
ηL
ηK
moderates (strengthens) the positive TFP effect of
trade liberalization.
The theoretical models that have built upon Melitz’s (2003) pioneering contribution, have
emphasized the positive TFP effect of trade liberalization. At the same time, recent empirical
evidence (Lawless and Whelan, 2008) has suggested that these effects might be only moderate.
Our analysis suggests that, in the presence of heterogeneity in factor shares, the increase in factor
market competition might actually dampen the increase in average TFP brought about by trade
liberalization, by forcing some of the capital intensive firms out of the market. Looking at factor
markets is thus crucial to gain a more nuanced understanding of the firm selection process.
8 Additional evidence
Having highlighted the role of heterogeneity in input shares for firm selection, we now return to
the data to determine whether the channels we have identified in the theoretical analysis do indeed
play a role. In particular, we will focus on Propositions 2 and 6, which summarize the core of our
findings. Thus, we will study how export growth and the factor intensity gap between exporters
and non–exporters interact in shaping firm selection. In our empirical implementation we focus
on differences in skill (human capital) intensities across firms.18
Proposition 2 suggests that, the larger is the factor intensity gap between exporters and non–
exporters, the more adverse is the effect of an increase in sector–wide exports on the probability
of survival for exporters. Non–exporters, on the other hand, should not be affected significantly.
18Using physical capital intensities instead does not affect the direction of our results.
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In order to assess this prediction, we first compute a measure of skill intensity for each plant as
the share of skilled wages in the total wage bill.19 Then, we calculate the difference between the
skill intensity of the median exporter and the skill intensity of the median non–exporter in each
3–digit ISIC sector and year. We call this difference the sector skill gap. Next, we divide the
3–digit sectors into two groups: those that have a sector skill gap above the median and those
that fall instead below the median. We then define a dummy variable equal to one for sectors
whose skill gap is above the median, and interact this variable with the aggregate exports of that
sector. A negative and statistically significant estimate for the interaction term in the regression
for exporters would support the predictions of our model.
The first three columns of Table 2 present the results of including the interaction term on
the 3–year survival probability of exporting plants.20 In all specifications, the impact of exports
on survival probability is still negative and significant. The dummy for high sector skill gap is
positive and significant, whereas the estimate for the interaction term is negative and statistically
significant in all cases. This implies that an increase in exports reduces the exporters’ survival
probability, and the effect is larger in sectors in which the skill intensity gap between exporters
and non–exporters is larger. The same effect is, however, not found among non–exporters, as
shown in columns 4–6. In this case, the sign of the interaction term is either positive or negative.
Still, it is either similar or smaller in magnitude and of the opposite sign than the estimate for
the direct effect of exports, which implies that the negative effect of the interaction term and the
positive estimate for exports cancel out. In other words, this confirms that export volumes do not
affect the probability of survival of non–exporters.
A second important prediction of our model follows from our analysis of the interaction be-
tween heterogeneity in TFP and heterogeneity in factor shares. In particular, proposition 6 has
shown that an increase in exports should increase sector–wide average productivity by less if the
skill intensity gap between exporters and non–exporters is large. To assess this hypothesis, we
estimate the effect of exports on productivity at the sector level, by including an interaction term
between exports and the sector skill gap dummy defined above. Our measure of sector j average
productivity at time t, TFPjt is a weighted average of plant–level productivity, where weights are
the share of the plant in industry output:21
TFPjt =
Njt∑
i=1
sijtTFPijt,
The sijt term represents plant i’s share in total output at time t, TFPijt is total factor productivity
of plant i at time t, andNjt is the number of plants in industry j at time t. To assess the importance
19This measure has been used, among others, by Pavcnik (2003), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a), and
Alvarez and Lopez (2009).
20We have obtained similar results looking at 1– and 5–year survival probabilities, and these findings are available
upon request.
21Remember that we calculate TFP separately for exporters and non–exporters.
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of factor relocation between firms on sector–wide TFP we follow Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Pavcnik (2002) and decompose it into two elements: the unweighted mean of productivity and a
covariance term between productivity and output:
TFPjt = TFP jt +
Njt∑
i=1
∆sijt∆TFPijt,
where ∆sijt = sijt − sjt, and ∆TFPijt = TFPijt − TFP jt, with sjt and TFP jt representing un-
weighted mean market share and unweighted mean productivity respectively. The covariance term
represents the contribution to the aggregate weighted productivity resulting from the reallocation
of market shares and resources across plants of different productivity levels.
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level and for common shocks
that may have affected all sectors, we include 3–digit level sector and year dummy variables.22 To
avoid potential simultaneity problems, exports are included lagged one period. The results are
presented in Table 6. The first column suggests that an increase in exports increases TFP. By
looking at column 3, we see though that over a third of this increase is driven by the reallocation
of resources towards the more productive firms. The effect, however, varies across sectors. To see
this, notice how the estimate for the interaction term between exports and the dummy for sectors
with high skill gap is negative and significant in column 1. This finding is completely explained
by the negative effect on the covariance term in column 3, which suggests that an increase in
the volume of exports generates a smaller reallocation of resources toward the more productive
firms in sectors in which the skill gap between exporters and non–exporters is high. This result
is consistent with our theoretical model and highlights the importance of the channels we have
identified.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we have began our analysis by documenting how Chilean exporters are less likely to
survive than non–exporters in the presence of export growth. We have argued that this stylized
fact is a puzzle from the point of view of the existing theoretical literature, and to address it we
have developed a new theoretical framework, in which the main driver of heterogeneity is given
by differences in factor input ratios across firms.
We have obtained several results. First, in a setting in which capital intensive firms have
higher fixed production costs and fixed export costs exist, only the more capital intensive firms
can afford to serve the foreign market after trade liberalization. Second, an increase in sector–wide
exports increases competition for capital, and its relative price. This reduces the profits of capital
intensive exporters, and increases those of labor intensive non–exporters. As a result, some of
22Including additional control variables, such as the share of MNC in total output, the size of the sector, and the
skill intensity of the sector does not affect the results in any significant way.
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the exporters will have to cease production. This effect is stronger, the bigger is the difference in
factor intensities between exporters and non–exporters.
Next, we have extended our analysis to include heterogeneity in TFP a la Melitz (2003), and
have studied how the two sources of heterogeneity interact in shaping firm selection. We have
shown that trade liberalization always increases sector–wide TFP, but that the size of the effect
is negatively related to the difference in factor input ratios between exporters and non–exporters.
Last, we have assessed two important predictions of our model using our Chilean firm–level
dataset. Not only have we found broad support for theoretical analysis, but we have also been able
to verify that the main channels we have identified do play a key role in explaining the observed firm
dynamics in Chile. Thus, our paper highlights the importance of taking into account heterogeneity
in factor input ratios to explain firm dynamics.
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Appendix
A Description of the dataset
The dataset covers all manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers, and it includes variables
such as sales, value added, employment, wages, exports, imports of intermediate inputs, industry
affiliation (ISIC Rev. 2),23 and other plants’ characteristics.24 Each plant has a unique identifica-
tion code which allows the researcher to follow it over time. Table A1 shows the number of plants
according to their export status. There is an average of 4911 plants during the period. About 21
percent of them are exporters, while the rest only produces for the domestic market. Table A2
presents one year, three year and five year survival rates. Exporters are systematically more likely
to survive than non–exporters, especially over long periods of time. For instance, out of the total
number of exporters in 1990, 85 percent continue operating five years later. The corresponding
figure for non–exporters is only 77 percent. Table A3 shows the unconditional mean values for
several characteristics of both exporters and non–exporters. Exporters are larger, more produc-
tive, more skill intensive, and are more likely to be foreign owned compared to non–exporters.
Plants that export are also more likely to use imported intermediate inputs and purchase foreign
technologies through licenses.
B Average foreign income
The level of foreign income is measured as a weighted average of the level of per capita GDP of the
15 main destination countries of Chilean exports for each industry. We divide the manufacturing
sector into 28 sub–sectors according to the 3–digit ISIC code. For each of these sectors we use
data from customs to calculate the main destinations of Chilean exports. The averages of the
shares of each country are used as weights. Thus, we define the foreign income relevant for sector
j at time t as:
GDPjt =
15∑
c=1
GDPct scj, (47)
where GDPct is the real per capita GDP of country c in year t (the per capita GDPs are in constant
U.S. dollars and come from the PennWorld Table v. 6.1). We keep the weights scj constant for
the entire period and compute them as:
scj =
T∑
t=1
1
T
Exportscjt
Exportsjt
, (48)
where Exportscjt is the value of exports from sector j to country c at time t, and Exportsjt is the
value of exports from sector j to all countries c at time t. T is the number of years.
23There are 29 manufacturing sectors at the 3–digit level. They include sectors such as food processing, textiles,
paper products, chemicals and metal products.
24All monetary variables are in constant 1985 pesos (annual price deflators are available in the case of Chile at
the 4–digit ISIC level).
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C Average capital share parameter in autarky
The zero profit conditions (equation 14) imply that, in general equilibrium, q (φi)+fi = q (φi)
σ
σ−1
for i = L,K. Furthermore, if we define the average capital share parameter in autarky as φ˜a ≡
φK+φL
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
equations 9 and 10 can be rewritten as:
L = I
1− φ˜a
φ˜ar1−σ + 1− φ˜a
, and K = I
φ˜a
φ˜ar1−σ + 1− φ˜a
Notice that these are the factor market equilibrium conditions that would result with (ηK + ηL)
average firms, each of which producing with the capital share parameter φ˜a. Finally, using the
definition of φ˜a it follows immediately that: P
1−σ =
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
(φ˜ar
1−σ + 1− φ˜a) (ηK + ηL).
D Proof of proposition 2
The proof proceeds in four steps. First, we show that rft ≥ ra. Let Ψa ≡
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
and
Ψft ≡
(
fK+fX
2fL
)(σ−1)/σ
. The ratio
rft
ra
is then given by:
rft
ra
=
{
[Ψft(1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨaφL]
[Ψa(1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨftφL]
}1/(1−σ)
. (49)
rft
ra
≥ 1 since Ψft ≤ Ψa which follows from our assumption that fK ≥ fX .
Second, we show that
rft
ra
is smaller, the larger is φK and the smaller is φL, i.e. the larger is
the factor intensity gap between capital and labor intensive firms. In fact:
∂(
rft
ra
)
∂φK
=
(φK −ΨftφL) (φK −ΨaφL)
(
φLr
1−σ
ft r
1−σ
a + 1− φL
)
( ra
rft
)σ 1−σ
Ψa−Ψft {[Ψa(1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨftφL]}
2 < 0 (50)
since Ψa ≥ Ψft and φK − ΨmφL > 0, m = a, ft, if the two types of firms are active in general
equilibrium. Furthermore:
∂(
rft
ra
)
∂φL
=
(φK −ΨftφL) (φK −ΨaφL)
(
φKr
1−σ
ft r
1−σ
a + 1− φK
)
( ra
rft
)σ 1−σ
Ψft−Ψa {[Ψa (1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨftφL]}
2 > 0 (51)
since, again, Ψa ≥ Ψft and φK − ΨmφL > 0, m = a, ft, if the two types of firms are active in
general equilibrium. Since the relationship between
rft
ra
and φi, i = K,L is monotonic, we can
assume in the following, without loss of generality: φK = 1− φL.
Third, we can show that the rightward shift of the FMC–condition with trade liberalization
does not depend on the factor intensity gap φK −φL. Solving the FMC–conditions under autarky
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and free trade (equations 15 and 26) for ( ηL
ηK
)a and (
ηL
ηK
)ft, and taking their ratio results in:
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
=
2(1−φK)−2 LK r
−σ
ft φK
L
K
r−σft (1−φK)−φK
1−φK− LK r
−σ
a φK
L
K
r−σa (1−φK)−φK
. (52)
Thus, for each constant level of r = rft = ra we get
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
= 2, i.e. the relative mass of labor
intensive firms doubles with trade liberalization. Therefore, the rightward shift of the FMC–curve
does not depend on the factor intensity gap.
Fourth, we can show that ηL
ηK
decreases (increases) with trade liberalization if the factor intensity
gap is at its maximum (minimum) level. The maximum value of the factor intensity gap is 1 since
φK and φL are restricted by the interval [0, 1]. We define the minimum level of the factor intensity
gap as that value which leads to (ηK
ηL
)a = 0. (
ηK
ηL
)a is given by (remember that φK = 1− φL):(
ηK
ηL
)
a
=
L
K
r−σa (1− φK)− φK
1− φK − LK r−σa φK
(53)
Thus, (ηK
ηL
)a = 0 if
L
K
r−σa (1 − φminK ) − φminK = 0 and the minimum factor intensity gap results as
φminK − (1− φminK ) = 2φminK − 1. In order to prove that φminK is uniquely defined, we substitute the
expression for ra into
L
K
r−σa (1− φminK )− φminK = 0. Rearranging terms leads to:(
ηK
ηL
)
a
= 0 ⇐⇒
[
φK (Ψa + 1)− 1
φK (Ψa + 1)−Ψa
]σ/(σ−1)
1− φK
φK︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Π
=
K
L
.
We are now able to determine the following partial derivative:
∂Π
∂φK
=
σ
σ − 1
[
φK (Ψa + 1)− 1
φK (Ψa + 1)−Ψa
] 1
1−σ (Ψa + 1) (1−Ψa)
[φK (Ψa + 1)−Ψa]2
−
(
φK (Ψa + 1)− 1
φK (Ψa + 1)−Ψa
) σ
σ−1 1
φ2K
. (54)
Equation 54 shows that ∂Π
∂φK
< 0 for all values of φK since Ψa > 1. Thus, (
ηK
ηL
)a = 0 only if
φK = φ
min
K . Furthermore, notice that (
ηK
ηL
)a > 0 if the numerator in the term for
ηK
ηL
(equation 53)
is negative since the denominator is already negative due to 1−φK
r−σφK
< L
K
. Thus, if φK > φ
min
K we
get L
K
r−σa (1− φK)− φK < 0 and (ηKηL )a > 0.
Therefore, since L
K
r−σa (1 − φminK ) − φminK = 0 and rft > ra, it follows immediately that ηKηL
increases with trade liberalization if the factor intensity gap is at its minimum level. Finally, if
the factor intensity gap between exporters and non–exporters is at its maximum, i.e. φK = 1 and
φL = 0, we have that (
ηK
ηL
)a =
KfL
LfK
> (ηK
ηL
)ft =
KfL
L(fX+fK)
, i.e. ηK
ηL
increases with trade liberalization.
E The zero profit condition in the right panel of figure 2
In this appendix the subscript a denotes variables in the autarkic equilibrium, ft1 variables in the
free trade equilibrium before any adjustment of relative factor prices and ft2 variables in the free
trade equilibrium after the adjustment of relative factor prices. Considering equations 4, 14 and
27
24, we can derive the axis–intercepts of the capital intensive firms’ zero profit condition. Under
autarky, they are given by:
ηK,a =
[
I
p(φK)
]
a
1
(σ − 1)fK and ηL,a =
[
Ip(φK)
−σ
p(φL)1−σ
]
a
1
(σ − 1)fK .
After trade liberalization and before any adjustment of relative factor prices, the axis intercepts
are given by:
ηK,ft1 =
[
I
p(φK)
]
ft1
1
(σ − 1)(fK + fX) and ηL,ft1 =
[
Ip(φK)
−σ
p(φL)1−σ
]
ft1
2
(σ − 1)(fK + fX) .
Since
[
I
p(φK)
]
a
=
[
I
p(φK)
]
ft1
and
[
Ip(φK)
−σ
p(φL)1−σ
]
a
=
[
Ip(φK)
−σ
p(φL)1−σ
]
ft1
, we get the following result:
ηK,ft1
ηK,a
=
fK
fK+fX
< 1 and
ηL,ft1
ηL,a
= 2fK
fK+fX
≥ 1, i.e. the curve becomes steeper.
In order to determine how the increase in r affects the ηK–axis intercept, we have to consider
the following partial derivative:
∂[I/p(φK)]
∂r
= −r−σc(φK)σ−2KφK
(
L
K
− 1− φK
φKr−σ
)
< 0. (55)
Thus,
[
I
p(φK)
]
ft2
<
[
I
p(φK)
]
ft1
and, concerning the ηK–axis intercepts, ηK,ft2 < ηK,ft1.
In order to determine how the increase in r affects the ηL–axis intercept, we first have to consider
that the increase in r makes the capital intensive firms’ zero profit condition ceteris paribus flatter:
the slope of the zero profit condition after trade liberalization is given by dηL
dηK
= −2
[
p(φK)
p(φL)
]1−σ
and ∂[p(φK)/p(φL)]
∂r
> 0. Second, we have to consider that a division of the zero profit conditions of
the two types of firms leads to
[
p(φK)
p(φL)
]−σ
= fK
fL
in the autarkic equilibrium (see equation 14) and
to
[
p(φK)
p(φL)
]−σ
= fK+fX
2fL
in the free trade equilibrium (see equation 24). Thus:
ηL,a =
[
I
p(φL)
]
a
1
(σ − 1)fL < ηL,ft2 =
[
I
p(φL)
]
ft2
1
(σ − 1)fL (56)
since ∂[I/p(φL)]
∂(r/w)
> 0. Finally, since the capital intensive firms’ zero profit condition becomes flatter
with the increase in r and since ηK,ft2 < ηK,ft1, we can conclude that ηL,ft2 < ηL,ft1.
F Proof of proposition 3
Remember that φ˜a =
φK+φL
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
. Since the production of each individual capital intensive
firm ceteris paribus doubles, the average sector–wide capital share parameter is given by φ˜ft =
2φK+φL
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
2+
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
. Thus, φ˜ft > φ˜a if and only if (φK − φL)
[
2
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
−
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
]
≥ 0. This condition
always holds since
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
= 2
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
if fK = fX and
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
< 2
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
if fK > fX , for any factor
intensity gap φK − φL.
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G Proof of proposition 4
If we define ΨN ≡
[
fK+(N−1)fX
NfL
]σ−1
σ
, the PC–condition can be written as follows:
rft =
[
ΨN(1− φL)− (1− φK)
φK −ΨNφL
] 1
1−σ
. (57)
The partial derivative of rft with respect to N results as follows:
∂rft
∂N
=
1
1− σr
σ
ft
φK − φL
(φK −ΨφL)2
∂Ψ
∂N
, with
∂Ψ
∂N
=
σ − 1
σ
Ψ1/(1−σ)
fL (fX − fK)
(NfL)
2 .
Since fK ≥ fX and φK > φL, it follows that the PC–curve shifts upwards with an increase in
the number of trading partners N . Notice also that limN→∞Ψ =
(
fX
fL
)σ−1
σ
. Thus, if N →∞, we
get rft > ra if fX < f and rft = ra if fK = fX . Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that
limN→∞ rft < 1 since
(
fX
fL
)(σ−1)/σ
> 1, i.e. rft is always strictly smaller than 1, even if N →∞.
Turning now to the panel on the right of figure 5, the ηL–axis intercept of the zero profit
condition for capital intensive firms is given by:
ηL,ft =
NIp (φK)
−σ
p (φL)
1−σ
1
[fK + (N − 1)fX ] (σ − 1) . (58)
The partial derivative with respect to N results as:
∂ηL,ft
∂N
=
Ip (φK)
−σ
p (φL)
1−σ
fK − fX
[fK + (N − 1) fX ]2 (σ − 1)
≥ 0. (59)
Furthermore, limN→∞ ηL,ft =
Ip(φK)
−σ
fXp(φL)
1−σ(σ−1) ≥ ηL,a =
Ip(φK)
−σ
fKp(φL)
1−σ(σ−1) . Finally, the ηK–axis inter-
cept of the zero profit condition for capital intensive firms is given by:
ηK,ft =
I
p (φK)
1
[fK + (N − 1) fX ] (σ − 1) . (60)
Thus, if N →∞ we get ηK,ft → 0 and ηL,ft > 0.
H Proof of lemma 4
Using our definition of A˜K , equation 38 can be rewritten as follows:
[
1
σ − 1
1
A˜K
q
(
A˜K , φK
)
− fK
]
=
fE
[1−G (A∗K)]
. (61)
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Since
q(A∗K ,φK)
q(A˜K ,φK)
=
(
A˜K
A∗K
)−σ
, the zero cutoff profit condition (equation 37) can be transformed to:
q
(
A˜i, φi
)
=
(
A˜i
A∗i
)σ
A∗i (σ − 1)fi. (62)
Substituting equation 62 into equation 61 and simplification leads to equation 45 in the main part.
I FMC curve under TFP heterogeneity
With heterogeneity in TFP we get aKK = A
σ−1
K φKr
−σc (AK , φK)
σ and aLK = A
σ−1
K (1−φK)c (AK , φK)σ.
Notice that ∂aKK
∂AK
< 0 and ∂aLK
∂AK
< 0, since c (AK , φK)
σ =
[
1
AK
(φKr
1−σ + 1− φK)1/(1−σ)
]σ
.
Fixed costs are not influenced by the TFP parameter, and are still given by equation 7. Let
f˜K ≡ fEK1−G(A∗K) + fK , i.e. f˜K stands for the total fixed costs in general equilibrium. The FMC
condition can be rewritten as:
L
K
=
∑
i=L,K (1− φi)
[
(φir
1−σ + 1− φi)1/(1−σ)
]σ [
1
A˜i
q
(
A˜i, φi
)
+ f˜i
]
ηi∑
i=L,K φir
−σ
[
(φir1−σ + 1− φi)1/(1−σ)
]σ [
1
A˜i
q
(
A˜i, φi
)
+ f˜i
]
ηi
. (63)
Finally, remembering that q
(
A˜i, φi
)
= IP σ−1
[
σ
σ−1
1
A˜i
(φir
1−σ + 1− φi)1/(1−σ)
]−σ
and that free
entry implies
q(A˜i,φi)
A˜i(σ−1) = f˜i =
fEi
1−G(A∗i )
+ fi, equation 63 can be simplified to:
L
K
=
(1− φK)A˜σ−1K + (1− φL)A˜σ−1L ηLηK
φKr−σA˜σ−1K + φLr−σA˜
σ−1
L
ηL
ηK
(64)
J Proof of proposition 5
To establish proposition 5, notice that from lemma 4 we know that A∗a,K and A
∗
a,L only depend
on the parameters fE and fi and the distribution of A. Therefore, A˜
σ−1
a,K and A˜
σ−1
a,L are determined
from equation 45 alone. Equations 40 and 41 can then be solved for r and ηL
ηK
like in the autarkic
equilibrium without firm heterogeneity in TFP. Finally, notice that the right hand side of equation
64 still depends positively on ηL
ηK
, i.e. equation 41 is still represented by a negatively sloping curve.
K Aggregation under TFP heterogeneity — autarky
Adding the TFP–terms
(
1
A˜L
)1−σ
and
(
1
A˜K
)1−σ
to the factor market clearing conditions of ap-
pendix C and defining A˜σ−1a ≡
A˜σ−1a,K+A˜
σ−1
a,L
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
and φ˜a ≡
φKA˜
σ−1
a,K+φLA˜
σ−1
a,L
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
A˜σ−1a,K+A˜
σ−1
a,L
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
, the factor market
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equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as follows:
L = I
[
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
]
A˜σ−1a (1−φ˜a)[
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
]
A˜σ−1a (φ˜ar1−σa +1−φ˜a)
= I
1− φ˜a
φ˜ar1−σa + 1− φ˜a
(65)
K = I
[
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
]
A˜σ−1a φ˜a[
1+
(
ηL
ηK
)
a
]
A˜σ−1a (φ˜ar1−σa +1−φ˜a)
= I
φ˜a
φ˜ar1−σa + 1− φ˜a
. (66)
These are the same conditions which would result in an economy with ηa = ηa,K + ηa,L average
firms, each of which producing with the technology parameters A˜a and φ˜a.
L Proof of lemma 5
Since A∗Xi is a function of A
∗
i (see equation 43), equation 45 can be solved for A
∗
ft,i. In order to prove
that A∗i increases with trade liberalization, we show that the term (1−G (A∗i ))
[(
A˜i
A∗i
)σ−1
− 1
]
≡ Λ
depends negatively on A∗i . Remember that A˜i =
[∫∞
A∗i
Aσ−1µ(A)dA
]1/(σ−1)
is also a function of A∗i .
Then, using Leibniz’s rule to calculate ∂A˜i
∂A∗i
, we obtain
∂Λ
∂A∗i
= −1−G (A
∗
i )
A∗i
(σ − 1)
(
A˜i
A∗i
)σ−1
< 0. (67)
Since trade liberalization adds the ex–ante expected profits from serving N − 1 foreign markets to
the left hand side of the free entry condition (see equation 45), the threshold TFP–parameter A∗i
has to increase so that Λ decreases and the free entry condition in the free trade situation holds
again.
M Proof of lemma 6
Assuming that A is distributed on [1,∞) according to a Pareto distribution with density g(A) =
k
Ak+1
and k > σ − 1, we get the following:
1−G(A) =
(
1
A
)K
and
A˜i
A∗i
=
(
k
1 + k − σ
)1/(σ−1)
. (68)
Thus, in the autarkic equilibrium the free entry condition is given by:(
1
A∗a,i
)k
fi
(
k
1 + k − σ − 1
)
= fE. (69)
Solving for A∗a,i yields:
A∗a,i =
(
fi
fE
σ − 1
1 + k − σ
)1/k
. (70)
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In the free trade equilibrium the free entry condition results as:
(
1
A∗ft,i
)k
fi
σ − 1
1 + k − σ +
 1A∗ft,i [ fi(N−1)fX ]1/(1−σ)

k
fX
σ − 1
1 + k − σ = fE. (71)
Solving for A∗ft,i leads us to:
A∗ft,i =

fi +
[
fi
(N−1)fX
]k/(σ−1)
fE
σ − 1
1 + k − σ

1/k
. (72)
Thus, we can determine the following ratio:
A∗ft,i
A∗a,i
=
[
1 + f
(1+k−σ)/(σ−1)
i (NfX)
k/(1−σ)
]1/k
. (73)
Equation 73 shows that a larger value for fi leads to a larger increase in A
∗
i with trade liberalization.
Thus, since fK > fL, the increase in A
∗
K due to trade liberalization exceeds the increase in A
∗
L.
Since A˜i
A∗i
=
(
k
1+k−σ
)1/(σ−1)
, it follows immediately that the increase in A˜K also exceeds the increase
in A˜L due to trade liberalization.
N Firm selection with trade liberalization and TFP heterogeneity
We can illustrate the relationship between the factor intensity gap and firm selection with trade
liberalization again by the upward shift of the PC–curve and the rightward shift of the FMC–
curve. The upward shift of the PC–curve is determined by the ratio
rft
ra
, whereas the rightward
shift of the FMC–curve is determined by the ratio
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
.
If we define Ψa ≡
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ (A∗a,K
A∗a,L
)(1−σ)2/−σ
and Ψft ≡
(
fK
fL
)(σ−1)/σ (A∗ft,K
A∗ft,L
)(1−σ)2/−σ
, the
ratio
rft
ra
is given by:
rft
ra
=
{
[Ψft(1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨaφL]
[Ψa(1− φL)− (1− φK)] [φK −ΨftφL]
}1/(1−σ)
. (74)
Notice that Ψft ≤ Ψa since A∗K increases with trade liberalization. Thus, rftra > 1.
Furthermore, the ratio
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
results as follows:
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
=
(1−φK)− LK r
−σ
ft φK
L
K
r−σft (1−φK)−φK
1−φK− LK r
−σ
a φK
L
K
r−σa (1−φK)−φK
(
A˜a,L
A˜a,K
)σ−1
(
A˜ft,L
A˜ft,K
)σ−1 . (75)
Compared to the case without firm heterogeneity in TFP, the term with the average TFP parame-
ters adds to the right hand side of equation 75. Since the average TFP parameters do not depend
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on the factor intensity gap φK−φL, both rftra and
(ηL/ηK)ft
(ηL/ηK)a
react to a change in the factor intensity
gap the same way as we described in appendix D for the case without firm heterogeneity in TFP.
O Aggregation under TFP heterogeneity — free trade
Using the terms for A˜σ−1ft and φ˜ft from the main part, equation 46 can be rewritten as follows:
L
K
r−σft =
1− φ˜ft
φ˜ft
. (76)
Equation 76 is the relative FMC condition that would result in an economy with ηft = ηft,K+ηft,L
average firms, each of which producing with the technology parameters φ˜ft and A˜ft.
P Proof of proposition 6
First, we will show that A˜σ−1ft > A˜
σ−1
a even if trade liberalization leads to the maximum possible
increase of ηL
ηK
. Remember that labor intensive firms experience a smaller productivity–enhancing
firm selection with trade liberalization. We have shown previously that a factor intensity gap
φK − φL = 1 leads to the maximum possible increase of ηLηK with trade liberalization. If φK = 1
and φL = 0, the FMC and the PC–conditions reduce, respectively, to:
L
K
r−σft =
1 + sL
1 + sK
A˜σ−1ft,L
A˜σ−1ft,K
(
ηL
ηK
)
ft
and rft =
(
fK
fL
)−1/σ(A∗ft,L
A∗ft,K
)(1−σ)/σ
.
Notice that the limiting case of sL = sK = 0 would represent the autarkic equilibrium. Combining
these two conditions, we obtain:
L
K
fK
fL
=
1 + sL
1 + sK
 A˜ft,LA∗ft,L
A˜ft,K
A∗ft,K
σ−1 ( ηL
ηK
)
ft
. (77)
Remember that A˜i
A∗i
=
(
k
1+k−σ
)1/(σ−1)
, i = K,L, under the assumption of a Pareto distribution for
the TFP parameter. Therefore, the term
(
A˜ft,L/A
∗
ft,L
A˜ft,K/A
∗
ft,K
)σ−1
on the right hand side of equation 77
is constant. This implies that trade liberalization, i.e. the term 1+sL
1+sK
falls below 1, increases ηL
ηK
,
so that the product 1+sL
1+sK
ηL
ηK
remains constant. However, the product 1+sL
1+sK
ηL
ηK
is the weighting
factor for A˜L in the term for A˜. Thus, in the case of a maximum possible increase of
ηL
ηK
with
trade liberalization, the relative weights for A˜K and A˜L in the term for A˜ do not change. Since
both A˜K and A˜L increase with trade liberalization, it follows immediately that the sector–wide
average TFP parameter A˜ increases with trade liberalization, even if the factor intensity gap is at
its maximum value.
Second, trade liberalization definitely leads to an increase of A˜ if the factor intensity gap is
smaller than 1. The increase in ηL
ηK
with trade liberalization then becomes smaller, implying that
A˜K gets a larger relative weight, while A˜L gets a smaller relative weight in the term for A˜. Thus,
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any smaller factor intensity gap definitely leads to an increase in the sector–wide average TFP
parameter A˜.
Finally, since the increase in A˜K with trade liberalization exceeds the increase in A˜L, an increase
(decrease) in ηL
ηK
implies that the increase in A˜ with trade liberalization becomes ceteris paribus
smaller.
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1: 3–year survival probability (probit, marginal effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exporters Non–exporters 
3–digit sector exports -0.041 -0.035 -0.035 -0.001 -0.001 0.011 
 (3.84)** (3.38)** (2.65)** (0.10) (0.13) (1.11) 
Employment 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (4.41)** (4.47)** (4.40)** (9.14)** (9.09)** (9.10)** 
Imports intermediate inputs dummy 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.056 0.056 0.055 
 (4.17)** (4.16)** (4.18)** (6.19)** (6.19)** (6.17)** 
Total factor productivity (TFP) 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.061 0.061 0.062 
 (7.11)** (7.03)** (7.08)** (17.28)** (17.29)** (17.18)** 
Share skilled wages total wage bill 0.014 0.013 0.014 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 
 (0.52) (0.49) (0.51) (4.93)** (4.93)** (4.95)** 
Foreign ownership dummy -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 -0.206 -0.206 -0.205 
 (2.99)** (2.98)** (2.99)** (10.65)** (10.65)** (10.64)** 
Foreign technology licenses dummy 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (1.53) (1.50) (1.52) (1.03) (1.04) (1.05) 
Age 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (7.14)** (7.08)** (7.14)** (10.76)** (10.71)** (10.76)** 
3–digit share of MNC in value added -0.100 -0.116 -0.100 0.049 0.050 0.048 
 (1.17) (1.38) (1.18) (0.86) (0.85) (0.85) 
3–digit sector employment  -0.135   0.004  
  (3.11)**   (0.11)  
3–digit sector value added   -0.028   -0.060 
   (0.75)   (2.33)* 
Number of observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 23,291 23,291 23,291 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors 
were clustered at the 3–digit sector–year level. Regressions include sector and year dummy variables. Exports, 
productivity, age, employment, and value added are in logs. 
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TABLE 2: 3–year survival probability and the skill intensity gap (probit, marginal effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exporters Non–exporters 
3–digit Sector Exports -0.035 -0.027 -0.026 0.003 0.003 0.017 
 (3.24)** (2.55)** (1.88)+ (0.30) (0.33) (1.74)+ 
3–digit Sector Exports  high sector skill gap -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.007 
 (2.20)* (2.64)** (2.24)* (1.74)+ (1.74)+ (1.91)+ 
High sector skill gap 0.171 0.196 0.174 0.099 0.100 0.106 
 (2.02)* (2.37)* (2.04)* (1.62) (1.63) (1.87)+ 
Employment 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (4.38)** (4.44)** (4.37)** (9.17)** (9.12)** (9.13)** 
Imports intermediate inputs dummy 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.056 0.056 0.055 
 (4.15)** (4.14)** (4.17)** (6.22)** (6.22)** (6.18)** 
Total factor productivity (TFP) 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.061 0.061 0.062 
 (7.09)** (7.01)** (7.08)** (17.26)** (17.23)** (17.22)** 
Share skilled wages total wage bill 0.015 0.014 0.015 -0.074 -0.074 -0.075 
 (0.54) (0.52) (0.53) (4.97)** (4.97)** (5.00)** 
Foreign ownership dummy -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.205 -0.205 -0.205 
 (2.95)** (2.94)** (2.95)** (10.63)** (10.63)** (10.62)** 
Foreign technology licenses dummy 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.015 
 (1.52) (1.49) (1.52) (1.02) (1.02) (1.03) 
Age 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (7.17)** (7.11)** (7.18)** (10.78)** (10.71)** (10.78)** 
3–digit share of MNC in value added -0.098 -0.117 -0.098 0.045 0.044 0.043 
 (1.12) (1.37) (1.13) (0.78) (0.74) (0.76) 
3–digit sector employment  -0.160   -0.006  
  (3.68)**   (0.15)  
3–digit sector value added   -0.043   -0.068 
   (1.10)   (2.70)** 
Number of observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 23,291 23,291 23,291 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors were clustered at the 
3–digit sector–year level. Regressions include sector and year dummy variables. Exports, productivity, age, employment, and value 
added are in logs. 
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TABLE 3: Effect of exports on TFP 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 TFP Unweighted TFP Covariance 
3–digit sector exports 0.146 0.094 0.052 
 (2.37)* (4.29)** (0.95) 
    
3–digit sector exports  high sector skill gap -0.011 0.000 -0.011 
 (2.34)* (0.12) (2.36)* 
    
No. Observations 243 243 243 
R–squared 0.927 0.974 0.798 
Absolute value of robust t–statistics in parentheses. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. Dummy variables for each 
year, sector, and for sectors with a high sector skill gap were included but no reported. Exports are lagged one period. 
 
 
Appendix Tables 
 
TABLE A1: Number of plants by export status 
  Exporters Non–exporters Total % of exporters 
1990 758 3,816 4,574 16.6 
1991 910 3,848 4,758 19.1 
1992 979 3,952 4,931 19.9 
1993 1,053 3,983 5,036 20.9 
1994 1,112 3,966 5,078 21.9 
1995 1,129 3,978 5,107 22.1 
1996 1,163 4,284 5,447 21.4 
1997 1,101 3,859 4,960 22.2 
1998 1,052 3,763 4,815 21.8 
1999 917 3,483 4,400 20.8 
Average 1990–99 1,017 3,893 4,911 20.7 
 
 
TABLE A2: Survival rates for exporters and non-exporters 
(Fraction of plants in each year that survive 1, 3, or 5 years) 
 Exporters  Non–Exporters 
  1–year 3–year 5–year   1–year 3–year 5–year 
1990 96.4 90.5 85.0  94.1 86.1 77.0 
1991 95.6 89.3 82.0  93.9 84.8 73.2 
1992 96.0 88.3 76.6  92.6 81.8 67.1 
1993 95.6 86.1 72.1  93.0 79.5 62.3 
1994 95.1 82.2 65.5  90.7 72.8 56.5 
1995 94.8 78.2 -  90.1 69.4 - 
1996 88.7 72.7 -  83.2 64.9 - 
1997 92.7 - -  89.6 - - 
1998 86.1 - -   82.0 - - 
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TABLE A3: Descriptive statistics: Mean values for 1990–1999 
  Exporters Non–exporters 
Employment (log) 4.67 3.48 
Importer intermediate inputs 0.56 0.18 
TFP (log) 7.56 6.87 
Share of skilled labor in total wage bill 0.47 0.35 
Capital–labor ratio 4,369.48 1,655.44 
Foreign ownership 0.15 0.03 
Foreign technology licenses 0.15 0.03 
Age (log) 2.21 2.11 
 
 
TABLE A4: 3–year survival probability  (IV probit, marginal effects) 
 (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) 
 exporters non–exporters 
3–digit Sector Exports -0.091 -0.086 -0.094 0.008 0.009 0.015 
 (2.44)* (2.11)* (2.28)* (0.58) (0.58) (1.04) 
Employment 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (4.47)** (4.50)** (4.45)** (9.28)** (9.22)** (9.24)** 
Imports intermediate inputs dummy 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.056 0.056 0.055 
 (4.12)** (4.11)** (4.11)** (6.58)** (6.57)** (6.52)** 
Total factor productivity (TFP) 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.061 0.061 0.062 
 (7.52)** (7.55)** (7.31)** (17.74)** (17.75)** (17.64)** 
Share skilled wages total wage bill 0.012 0.012 0.013 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.47) (4.89)** (4.89)** (4.91)** 
Foreign ownership dummy -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 -0.206 -0.206 -0.205 
 (2.81)** (2.81)** (2.78)** (9.37)** (9.37)** (9.37)** 
Foreign technology licenses dummy 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (1.52) (1.50) (1.55) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08) 
Age 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (7.24)** (7.20)** (7.26)** (10.58)** (10.54)** (10.57)** 
3–digit share of MNC in value added -0.116 -0.127 -0.113 0.054 0.053 0.049 
 (1.24) (1.38) (1.18) (0.93) (0.89) (0.87) 
3–digit sector employment  -0.091   -0.006  
  (1.65)+   (0.14)  
3–digit sector value added   0.042   -0.066 
   (0.65)   (2.20)* 
Number of observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 23,291 23,291 23,291 
Wald Test of exogeneity 
(p–value) 
1.81 
(0.1783) 
1.58 
(0.2089) 
2.20 
(0.1383) 
0.52 
(0.4728) 
0.50 
(0.4792) 
0.12 
(0.7313) 
F–test excluded instruments 44.53 38.91 35.52 59.31 52.92 46.54 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Standard errors 
were clustered at the 3–digit sector–year level. Regressions include sector and year dummy variables. Exports, 
productivity, age, employment, and value added are in logs. Instrumented: 3–digit sector exports. Instrument: 
Weighted average of per capita GDP of the 15 main export destination countries of each sector. 
 
 
